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Abstract
In the generalized Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath
draw a, b and c cards, respectively, from a deck of size a+ b+ c. Alice
and Bob must then communicate their entire hand to each other,
without Cath learning the owner of a single card she does not hold.
Unlike many traditional problems in cryptography, however, they are
not allowed to codify or hide the messages they exchange from Cath.
The problem is then to find methods through which they can achieve
this. We propose a general four-step solution based on finite vector
spaces, and call it the “colouring protocol”, as it involves colourings
of lines.
Our main results show that the colouring protocol provides a so-
lution to the generalized Russian cards problem in cases where a is a
power of a prime, c = O(a2) and b = O(c2). This improves substan-
tially on the collection of parameters for which solutions are known.
In particular, it is the first solution which allows the eavesdropper to
have more cards than one of the communicating players.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this article is to provide a solution to the generalized Russian
cards problem [1] based on finite vector spaces. The problem is parametrized
by the triple (a, b, c), which we will often call its size and may be stated as
follows:
The generalized Russian cards problem
Alice, Bob and Cath each draw a, b and c cards, respectively, from
a deck of a+ b+ c. All players know which cards were in the deck
and how many of them the other players drew, but each player
may only see the cards in their own hand.
Alice and Bob, however, want to know exactly which cards the
other holds. Moreover, they do not want for Cath to learn who
holds any card whatsoever, aside of course from her own cards.
However, they may only do so by making unencrypted public
announcements, so that Cath can learn all the information that
they exchange.
Can Alice and Bob achieve this?
Some general assumptions are needed to make the problem precise, which
we shall formalize in Section 2. First, the cards are dealt beforehand in a se-
cure phase which we treat as a black box and gives the players no information
about others’ cards. The agents have no communication before this phase
and cannot share secrets (such as private keys). Second, the agents have
unlimited computational capacity.1 This means, on one hand, that solutions
via encryption are not valid, provided they are vulnerable to cryptanalisis
(independently of its computational cost). It also means that we shall not be
concerned with the feasibility of agents’ strategies, although this is certainly
an important line for future inquiry. Third, all strategies are public knowl-
edge, in keeping with Kerckhoffs’ principle [4]. These assumptions turn the
problem into a challenging combinatorial puzzle.
1This assumption is unusual in traditional cryptography but is standard in information-
theoretic approaches where unconditional rather than probabilistic security is sought [8].
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A (possible) solution to the generalized Russian cards problem is a pro-
tocol; these shall also be discussed formally in Section 2. The solution we
propose is, to the best of our knowledge, the first solution to the generalized
Russian cards problem which works in cases where Cath holds more cards
than Alice.
The Russian cards problem itself originates with Kirkman [5]. There,
the solution takes the form of a design, a collection of subsets of a given
set that satisfies certain regulaties [11]. The design consists of seven triples.
Cryptography based on card deals is also investigated in various other (not
necessarily related) publications, such as [9, 10].
Many instances of the generalized Russian cards problem have been stud-
ied. We remark that all of these protocols obtain a notion of security called
weak 1-security by Swanson and Stinson [12], the notion we are concerned
with in this paper. A stronger and more general notion of perfect k-security is
also considered by them but we shall not treat it here. The known solutions
are as follows.
1. The original (3, 3, 1) case has been extensively studied and has many
solutions [5, 7].
2. The case (4, 4, 2) has a three-step solution given in [13], where it is also
shown that there is no two-step solution.
3. All cases (a, 2, 1) provided a ≡ 0, 4 (mod 6) have been solved in [1].
4. All cases (a, b, 1) with both a, b > 2 have been solved in [2].
5. If c+ 1 < a then there is a solution for b = O(a2) [1].
The case (a, b, 1) with a, b > 2 subsumes the case (3, b, 1) for b ≥ 3, also
covered previously in [1]; [12] demonstrates that, for the stronger notion
of perfect 1-security, every announcement in a (3, b, 1) solution is a Steiner
triple. They have yet another characterization result for perfect k-security.
Our main contribution is to provide solutions for infinitely many cases
where b = O(c2) and either c = O(a3/2) or c = O(a2), the first known
solutions for c > a. We remark that all but one of the previously known
protocols are two-step protocols, whereas our protocol is in four steps. In [1]
it is shown that there can be no two-step solution if c ≥ a−1. As we provide
solutions with c > a, the protocol we propose is longer. We do not know if a
shorter, three-step variant is possible.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes our model of
security and our notion of protocol. Section 3 gives an informal description
of the protocol, in order to motivate the more specific description given in
Definition 3.6. This protocol depends on certain parameters which do not
exist for all values of (a, b, c). The conditions under which such parameters
exist are treated in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 computes explicit bounds
on the parameters for which the protocol is executable.
2 Protocols and security
In this section we shall present the notion of protocol we shall use. Through-
out this paper, we assume that D is a fixed, finite set of “cards”. A card
deal is a partition (A,B,C) of D; the deal has size (a, b, c) if A is an a-set,
B a b-set and C a c-set, where by “x-set” we mean a set of cardinality x.
The set of x-subsets of Y is written
(
Y
x
)
. We think of A as the hand of Alice,
or that Alice holds A; similarly, B and C are the hands of Bob and Cath,
respectively. In general we may simply assume that D = {1, . . . , a + b + c},
and define Deal(a, b, c) to be the set of partitions of D of size (a, b, c).
Central to this text is the notion of protocol. Roughly, a protocol is
a family of rules or instructions that Alice and Bob must follow in order to
send out a sequence of public announcements. Protocols are in principle non-
deterministic, assigning only a probability measure to the announcements
that an agent may make.
In [12] and other papers, an announcement has been modelled as a set
of hands that one of the agents may hold. Thus Alice would announce a
subset A of (D
a
)
, indicating that A ∈ A. More specifically, an announcement
is a pair (i,A), where i is the agent making the announcement (either Alice
or Bob). But for our proposed solution, agents’ announcements are not in
one-one correspondence to subsets of
(
D
a
)
. Because of this, it will be simpler
to model announcements as elements of a countable or finite set, say N; a
similar setup is proposed in [12], where Alice enumerates all subsets of
(
D
a
)
by A0,A1, . . . ,An and merely announces the appropriate subindex.
Thus we let Ann = {Alice, Bob}× J be the set of announcements, where
J ⊆ N. A sequence of announcements ~α = (i0, φ0), (i1, φ1), . . . , (in, φn) is a
run. We shall write Run for the set of runs, including the empty sequence.
An (unusual) assumption of the problem is that there is a secure deal-
ing phase which we treat as a black box. Initially, a card deal is selected
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randomly and players have knowledge of their own cards and of the size
(a, b, c) of the deal, but know nothing more about others’ cards. Thus they
are not able to distinguish between different deals where they hold the same
hand. We model this by equivalence relations between deals; since from Al-
ice’s perspective, (A,B,C) is indistinguishable from (A,B′, C ′), we define
(A,B,C)
Alice∼ (A′, B′, C ′) if and only if A = A′. We also define analogous
equivalence relations for Bob and Cath.
In [12], Swanson and Stinson define strategies of length two as assigning a
probability distribution to Alice’s possible announcements (after which Bob
announces Cath’s hand), and consider n-equitable strategies as a special
case where Alice always has n possible announcements each with probability
1/n. We will work with equitable strategies (and merely call them protocols),
where probability is distributed evenly among the possible outcomes but the
number of outcomes is left unspecified. This will allow us to dispense with
probability measures and only determine a set of possible announcements at
each stage of the protocol. On the other hand, we consider protocols which
may have more than two steps, making our definition more elaborate than
Swanson and Stinson’s.
Definition 2.1 (Protocol). Let Deal = Deal(a, b, c).
A protocol (with (a, b, c) as parameters) is a pair of functions (j, pi) as-
signing to every deal δ ∈ Deal and every run ~α ∈ Run an agent j(~α) ∈
{Alice, Bob} and a finite set pi(δ, ~α) ⊆ N such that if δ′ j(~α)∼ δ, then pi(δ′, ~α) =
pi(δ, ~α).
Thus once a deal has been given, a protocol assigns to each run a player
who is to make the next announcement and a set of possible announcements
for the player to make. These announcements are determined exclusively
by the information an agent has access to, which is assumed to be only (i)
their hand, (ii) the parameters a, b, c, (iii) the announcements that have been
made previously and (iv) the protocol being executed.
Protocols are non-deterministic in principle and hence may be executed
in many ways; an execution of a protocol is a pair (δ, ~α), where δ is a deal, ~α =
(i0, φ0), . . . , (in, φn) a run and, for all k < n, ik+1 = j
(
(i0, φ0), . . . , (ik, φk)
)
and φk+1 ∈ pi
(
δ, (i0, φ0), . . . , (ik, φk)
)
.
The first property that a protocol needs to have in order to be successful
is for its set of executions to be non-empty. This observation seems trivial
but it will occupy a large portion of the paper.
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Definition 2.2 (Executability). Given a natural number N , a protocol is N -
executable if for every deal δ there is an execution (δ, ~α) where α has length
N .
We may omit the parameter N and let it be given by context; the protocol
we propose has four steps so we take N = 4.
The second property that a protocol must have to be successful is that
Alice and Bob know each other’s cards (and hence the entire deal) after its
execution:
Definition 2.3 (Informativity). An execution ((A,B,C), ~α) is informative
for Alice if there is no execution ((A,B′, C ′), ~α) with C ′ 6= C.
Similarly, an execution ((A,B,C), ~α) is informative for Bob if there is
no execution ((A′, B, C ′), ~α) with C ′ 6= C.
A protocol is informative if there exists N such that the protocol is N-
executable and every execution of length N is informative both for Alice and
for Bob.
The third property is that, given a card x which Cath does not hold, she
should consider it possible that either Alice holds it or Bob holds it:
Definition 2.4 (Safety). An execution ((A,B,C), ~α) of a protocol (j, pi) is
safe if for every x 6∈ C there is
1. a deal δ′ = (A′, B′, C) such that x ∈ A′ and (δ′, ~α) is also an execution
of (j, pi), as well as
2. a deal δ′′ = (A′′, B′′, C) such that x ∈ B′′ and (δ′′, ~α) is also an execu-
tion of (j, pi).
The protocol (j, pi) is safe if every execution of (j, pi) is safe.
Safety is equivalent to weak 1-security as defined by Swanson and Stinson
[12], but this is not the only notion of security they discuss. Weak security
is equivalent to the statement that for all C, x 6∈ C and every execution ~α of
the protocol,
0 < Pr(x ∈ A|C, ~α) < 1
(where Pr(X|Y ) denotes conditional probability). Stronger notions of se-
curity would demand that Cath does not gain probabilistic information, so
that
Pr(x ∈ A|C, ~α) = a
a+ b
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(perfect 1-security in [12]). In this paper we will only be concerned with
weak security.
3 The protocol
In this section we shall describe the general colouring protocol, the central
focus of this article. Before we do so, let us briefly describe some of the
notation we shall use.
We will use p to denote a prime or a power of a prime, and Fp the field
with p elements. If d is any natural number, Fdp denotes the vector space of
dimension d over Fp. For a line ` = x + λy, we say y is a directing vector of
`. We denote by Ldp the set of all lines in Fdp. The theory of finite fields and
finite geometries has been extensively studied; see, for example, [6, 3].
For natural numbers d, n we define σd(n) to be the sum n
d−1 + nd−2 +
. . . + n0. We know from basic algebra that σd(n) = (n
d − 1)/(n − 1). This
will be a very useful quantity to keep in mind; for example,
Lemma 3.1. Given x ∈ Fdp, there are σd(p) distinct lines passing through x.
Let p be a prime or a prime power and d ≥ 2. Assume that Alice holds as
many cards as points in a line of Fdp (i.e. a = p) and that Alice, Bob and Cath
together hold as many cards as points in the whole space (i.e. a+ b+ c = pd).
Let K be a set of k colours, identified with the numbers 1, . . . , k. Colourings
will be a crucial element in our protocol:
Definition 3.1 (Colouring). A k–colouring is a function ξ : Ldp → K.
That is, ξ assigns a colour from {1, . . . k} to each line in Fdp.
Let us now give an informal account of the protocol; Definition 3.6 will
give a formal version and Section 4 will study its executability. It consists of
the following four steps:
1. Alice maps all the cards into Fdp in such a way that her cards form a
line and announces the mapping.
2. Bob announces a suitably chosen k-colouring ξ.
3. Alice announces the colour of her hand according to ξ.
4. Bob announces Cath’s cards.
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Of course, we have yet to specify what a suitable colouring is. This
will be the focus of the rest of this section. In order to guarantee that
the protocol is informative (Alice and Bob can deduce the card deal after
the protocol’s execution), the colouring must be distinguished, as defined
below. For it to be safe (Cath cannot learn any of Alice or Bob’s cards), the
colouring should also be rich. However, colourings which are merely rich and
distinguished may give Cath too much information, and thus we will have to
replace the condition of being distinguished by the stronger version of being
very distinguished. Once we have defined these notions the next question
is for which a, b, c and k such colourings exist, i.e., when the protocol is
executable; this shall be the topic of later sections.
First let us focus on making the protocol be informative. Given a card
deal (A,B,C), we should design ξ in such a way that only A itself can be
the line entirely contained in A∪C of whichever colour Alice announces. In
this way, Bob can unequivocally identify A. But there may be many such
spaces contained in A ∪ C, and at the beginning of the protocol Bob has no
way of telling them apart. Thus we arrive at the following:
Definition 3.2 (Distinguished colouring). We say that a k–colouring ξ is
distinguished for a set E ⊆ Fdp if no two distinct lines contained entirely in
E have the same colour.
0 1 2
0
1
2
0 1 2
0
1
2
Figure 1: A simple 2-colouring.
Example 3.1. Figure 1 illustrates the possible effects of a distinguished
colouring. The left picture shows a 2-colouring that Bob announces after
Alice maps the cards into F23. Throughout the examples we will continue to
use black squares for Alice’s cards, white circles for Bob’s and black triangles
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for Cath’s, so that cards held by Alice or Cath are black-filled shapes. Alice’s
cards A form the line {00, 01, 02}. Cath’s cards C are {12, 22}. The set
A ∪ C also contains the line {02, 12, 22}.
In order to enable Alice, by her later response, to distinguish between
the lines, Bob announces the 2-colouring in the the left picture. It has two
‘colours’: solid lines and dashed lines. Ellipses in the figure are lines as well,
e.g. {02, 10, 21} is a dashed line.
Suppose Alice announces that her line is solid. Then, Bob will learn
Alice’s cards and he can announce Cath’s cards. But the colouring that Bob
announces is not safe. After Alice announces that her cards are a solid line,
Cath discards all solid lines that meet some of her points. The right picture
in Figure 1 shows the only two lines that Cath cannot discard. This makes
Cath learn that Alice has 02 and that Bob has 10 and 21.
Hence, colourings that are merely distinguished will make the colouring
protocol informative but not necessarily safe. To remedy this, we must have
enough colours, and the colouring must be rich enough, so that for every
card that Cath does not hold she should consider it possible both that Alice
holds it and that Alice does not hold it.
Definition 3.3 (Rich colouring). A k–colouring ξ is rich (or c–rich) if for
any c-set C, colour i, and point x 6∈ C, there is an i-coloured line A contain-
ing x that avoids C and there also is an i-coloured line A′ not containing x
that avoids C.
Rich and distinguished colourings are almost suitable, but we shall need
an extra condition. Notice that Cath knows that Bob is to design the colour-
ing so that it turns out to be informative. Thus, the colouring not only
should be distinguished for the actual set of cards A ∪ C but also for every
set of cards that Bob wants Cath to consider as possible. These will be the
sets with the same hue as A ∪ C:
Definition 3.4 (Hue). Let ξ be a k-colouring.
Given E,F ⊆ Fdp, we write E ≈ξ1 F if there are lines `, h of the same
colour such that ` ⊆ E, h ∩ (E \ `) = ∅ and F = (E \ `) ∪ h. We will say
E,F are one swap apart.
We then let ≈ξ be the reflexive and transitive closure of ≈ξ1, and define a
hue to be an equivalence class under ≈ξ.
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Definition 3.5 (Very distinguished colouring). We say that a k–colouring ξ
is very distinguished for E ⊆ Fdp if ξ is distinguished for every F of the same
hue as E.
p
q
p
q
p
q
Figure 2: A 2-colouring which is distinguished but not very distinguished
Example 3.2. Figure 2 shows an example of a 2-colouring in Fn4 for some n.
We have represented only some points and lines in the space. Let’s suppose
that the colouring is 6–rich. In the situation represented on the left, the
colouring is distinguished. A ∪ C contains two lines with different colours.
But the sets of points shown in the middle and right pictures are of the same
hue as A ∪C, and the set of points in the right picture contains two lines of
the same colour. Then our colouring is not distinguished in the right picture,
so it is not very distinguished in the left one.
This means that the presented 2-colouring is not safe, even in the left
picture. Cath may learn that the points p and q belong to Bob, reasoning as
follows. Alice cannot have both points, because Alice’s points are aligned, but
she could have one of them, as can be seen in the center picture. However,
if it were the case that Alice has one point (say, p), Bob should assign the
line containing p, q a different colour to the other two lines in A∪C, to keep
Cath from learning that Bob has q. A similar reasoning applies to q, and
thus Cath learns that Bob has both p and q.
With these considerations we know which kind of colouring Bob should
use: a suitably chosen colouring is rich and very distinguished, and as we shall
see, the protocol so defined is safe and informative. With this we may give
a formal definition of our protocol. Note that it depends on a parameter k
which will be specified later (see Sections 4, 5). Note also that the protocol is
non-deterministic; recall that we are assuming all distributions to be uniform.
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Definition 3.6 (Colouring protocol). Let (a, b, c, k) be natural numbers such
that a is a prime power and for some natural number d, a+ b+ c = ad. Let
D = {1, 2, . . . , a+b+c} and identify a natural number with (i) each bijection
f : D → Fda (ii) each k–colouring ξ, (iii) each of the k colours and (iv) each
element of
(
D
c
)
.
Let (A,B,C) be a deal of size (a, b, c). Then, the protocol is as follows.
1. Alice randomly chooses a bijection f : D → Fda in such a way that her
cards form a line. She announces f .
2. Bob randomly chooses a k–colouring ξ which is rich and very distin-
guished for A ∪ C and announces ξ.
3. Alice announces the colour of her hand.
4. Bob announces Cath’s cards C.
Strictly speaking, when we state that “Alice announces f” it is understood
that she announces the natural number assigned2 to the function f , and
similarly to other steps in the protocol. Thus an execution can be represented
in the form
(Alice, f), (Bob, ξ), (Alice, n), (Bob,X)
where f : D → Fda, ξ is a colouring, n a colour and X ∈
(
D
c
)
. Since the
players take turns we may omit the agents and write (f, ξ, n,X).
With this in mind, let us see that the colouring protocol is indeed a
protocol as defined in Section 2. Intuitively, we must show that every an-
nouncement depends only on information available to the respective player.
Lemma 3.2. The colouring protocol satisfies Definition 2.1.
Proof. Denote the colouring protocol by (j, pi), where j(~α) = Alice if ~α has
even length and otherwise j(~α) = Bob and pi(δ, ~α) is the set of possible
announcements as specified by Definition 3.6. We need to verify that pi is
invariant under
j(~α)∼ . Let us do this step by step:
2Alice’s first announcement does not correspond one-one to sets of hands that she
may hold, for many mappings may define the same set of lines (just compose f with an
invertible linear transformation). A similar observation applies to Bob’s colourings. This
is why we do not model announcements as sets of hands, as is done, for example, in [1].
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1 Alice announces a map f : D → Fdp in such a way that her cards form
a line. Suppose (A,B,C)
Alice∼ (A′, B′, C ′) and f ∈ pi((A,B,C), ()), so that
A = A′ and f maps A into a line `. Then, f(A′) = f(A) = ` and hence
f ∈ pi((A′, B′, C ′), ()), as required.
2 Bob announces a rich and very distinguished k–colouring ξ. Suppose that
(A,B,C)
Bob∼ (A′, B′, C ′) and ξ ∈ pi((A,B,C), (f)), so that ξ is a rich and
very distinguished colouring for f(A ∪ C). But since B = B′ we also have
A∪C = A′∪C ′ and thus ξ is also rich and very distinguished for f(A′∪C ′),
so that ξ ∈ pi((A,B,C), (f)), as required.
3 Alice announces the colour of her hand according to ξ. As before, sup-
pose that (A,B,C)
Alice∼ (A′, B′, C ′) and n ∈ pi((A,B,C), (f, ξ)). Then,
ξ(f(A′)) = ξ(f(A)) = n so we have that n ∈ pi((A,B′, C ′), (f, ξ)).
4 Bob announces Cath’s cards. Once again suppose that (A,B,C)
Bob∼
(A′, B, C ′). By our specification X ∈ pi((A,B,C), (f, ξ, n)) if and only if
X = C, so we must show that if ((A′, B, C ′), (f, ξ, n)) is an execution of the
protocol then C = C ′.
Since ξ is distinguished there is a unique line ` ⊆ f(A ∪ C) = f(A′ ∪ C ′)
with ξ(`) = n. Since Alice’s hand forms a line, we have f−1(`) = A = A′.
Thus C = (D \B) \ A = (D \B) \ A′ = C ′, as required.
It remains to check that the colouring protocol indeed provides a solution
to the generalized Russian cards problem:
Theorem 3.1. The colouring protocol is safe and informative, provided it is
executable.
Proof. The protocol is obviously informative given Bob’s last announcement,
so we focus on safety. Let ~α = (f, ξ, n, C) be an execution of the colouring
protocol.
First pick x that Cath does not hold. Because ξ is rich, there is a line `
with colour i passing through f(x) and not meeting C. Further, note that
f(A) ∪ f(C) ≈ξ1 ` ∪ f(C), so that ξ is also very distinguished for ` ∪ f(C).
Then, setting A′ = f−1(`) we see that ((A′, B′, C), ~α) is also an execution of
the protocol, but x ∈ A′.
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The argument that Cath also considers it possible that Alice does not
hold x is very similar. Since the set C has exactly c elements, there is a
line h with colour i not meeting f(C) ∪ {f(x)}, so that setting A′′ = f−1(h)
and reasoning as above, ((A′′, B′′, C), ~α) is another execution of the protocol
where Bob holds x.
Thus the colouring protocol is safe.
We have so far worked under the assumption that the protocol is exe-
cutable. The rest of the paper will be devoted to examining when this is the
case, and determining the parameter k.
4 Executability
In what follows we will look for conditions to guarantee the existence of a
rich and very distinguished k–colouring for some number of colours k. First,
let us introduce the notion of density:
Definition 4.1 (Density). Say a k–colouring ξ has density m if, given a
point x ∈ Fdp and a colour i, there are at least m i–coloured lines through x.
There is a close connection between density and richness; to be precise,
a colouring that is dense enough is automatically rich.
Lemma 4.1. If ξ is a k–colouring of density c+ 2, then ξ is rich.
Proof. Let E be a subset of Fdp with c elements. Fix a colour i and a point
x 6∈ E. We note that if `, h are two distinct lines passing through x, then
` ∩ h = {x}. Therefore, E contains the disjoint union⋃
{E ∩ ` : x ∈ ` and ξ(`) = i}.
It follows that for some ` with ξ(`) = i and x ∈ `, E ∩ ` must be empty,
otherwise E would have at least c+ 2 elements.
Similarly, if we pick y 6∈ E different from x, we see that there is an
i-coloured line through y not meeting E ∪{x}, satisfying the second require-
ment.
Thus in order to construct rich colourings, we may focus on constructing
dense colourings; this is not too difficult, as witnessed by the following:
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Lemma 4.2. Let `1, ..., `k be distinct lines of Fdp and assume that σd(p) ≥
k(m + 1). Then, there is a k–colouring ξ of density m such that for i ≤ k,
ξ(`i) = i.
Proof. There are σd(p) ≥ k(m+ 1) non-collinear vectors in Fdp, and hence we
can pick a set D of mk non–collinear vectors which are not directing vectors
of any of the lines `i. Partition D into k disjoint sets Di of m elements.
Then, given a line h ∈ Fdp, put ξ(h) = i if either h = `i or h has directing
vector in Di for some i ≤ k. Otherwise put, for instance, ξ(h) = 1. It is easy
to see that ξ satisfies the desired properties.
This will be sufficient for finding rich colourings. Now our goal is to
construct a very distinguished k–colouring for A ∪ C. As with richness, we
will do so by introducing a stronger, approximate notion – that of a perfect
colouring. It is not easy to tell under which conditions very distinguished
colourings exist or how one may go about finding one, but finding perfect
colourings will be straightforward.
The notion of a perfect colouring has the disadvantage that perfection is
not hue-invariant. To deal with this issue, we will first need an intermedi-
ate concept: that of critical colourings. Every perfect colouring is critical
and every critical colouring is very distinguished. Perfect colourings are the
easiest to identify, but critical colourings are easier to work with than either
perfect or very distinguished colourings.
Let us then begin by defining critical colourings:
Definition 4.2 (Critical colouring). Given E ⊆ Fdp, we say that a k-colouring
ξ is critical for E if there exists a set L = {`∗1, . . . , `∗n} of different colours
such that, for every line h ⊆ Fdp, we have∣∣∣∣∣(h ∩ E) \⋃
i≤n
`∗i
∣∣∣∣∣ < p− k,
where |S| stands for the cardinality of a set S. We will say the lines in L are
ξ-critical lines for E.
The notion of critical colouring in Definition 4.2 captures an important
difference between the 2-colourings in Figures 2 and 3. The 2-colouring in
Figure 2 is not critical for E = A ∪ C, as for any set of lines L that we can
select, there is a line h such that∣∣∣(h ∩ E) \⋃L∣∣∣ ≥ 2 = p− k,
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as the reader may verify by examination.
On the other hand, the colouring in the left-hand side of Figure 3 is
critical for E = A ∪ C, the union of the two lines and the fragment. We
select L as the two complete lines in E. Then, for any line h, the property
of Definition 4.2 holds. In particular, the line h with the three holes is the
line outside of L with most points in E. For that line,∣∣∣(h ∩ E) \⋃L∣∣∣ = p− 3 < p− 2.
Recall Example 3.2, where we showed that the colouring in Figure 2 is
unsafe. Intuitively, the insecurity of a k-colouring (in Figure 2 we have k = 2)
is produced because A∪C contains k lines, along with a line fragment ` with
k or less gaps – observe the line missing p and q in Figure 2. Then, though
the k-colouring is distinguished, it might not be very distinguished, as we
may be able to use several swaps to move the k lines and fill all the gaps in
`, thus generating k + 1 lines and repeating a colour.
However, when A ∪ C contains k or less lines and all fragments have
more than k points missing, then a distinguished k-colouring ξ is always
very distinguished. Figure 3 shows an example of this situation.
Figure 3: A critical 2-colouring
Example 4.1. In the left-hand side of Figure 3, A∪C contains two lines and
a fragment with three or more points missing. Alice has one of these lines,
and Cath has the other line plus the segment. Then, a swap corresponds to
moving a line to an empty position of the same colour, and it is not possible
to arrange the two lines in A ∪ C in such a way that they fill the three gaps
in the fragment. Thus there is no configuration of the same hue for which ξ
is not distinguished, so that ξ is very distinguished.
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The above considerations suggest that critical colourings are very distin-
guished, and indeed this will turn out to be the case. Before we show this,
let us make a simple observation:
Lemma 4.3. If ξ is a critical k–colouring for E and ` ⊆ E, then ` is a
ξ–critical line for E, independently of how the other critical lines are chosen.
Proof. Let L = {`∗1, . . . , `∗n} be ξ-critical lines for E. Notice that since they
are lines of different colours, we have n ≤ k. If ` is not ξ–critical then for
every i ≤ n, ` ∩ `∗i is either empty or a singleton. It therefore follows that∣∣∣(` ∩ E) \⋃L∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣` \⋃
i≤n
`∗i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ p− n ≥ p− k,
which contradicts the definition of a critical k–colouring.
Now we will check that critical colourings are very distinguished. For this,
it suffices to show that they are distinguished and that a critical colouring
for E is critical for the entire hue of E; the former is straightforward, the
latter rather involved.
Lemma 4.4. Every critical k–colouring for E is distinguished for E.
Proof. From Lemma 4.3 it follows that if ` ⊆ E then it is critical; but there
is at most one critical line of each colour so there cannot be h 6= ` of the
same colour both contained in E.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose ξ is a critical k-colouring for E with k < p and F has
the same hue as E. Then, ξ is also a critical colouring for F .
Proof. We shall prove this by induction on the number of swaps between E
and F . The base case (F = E) is vacuous. For the inductive step, suppose
F = (G \ λ1) ∪ λ2 with ξ(λ1) = ξ(λ2) = j and G one swap closer to E
than F is, so that by induction we may assume that there are ξ-critical lines
`∗1, . . . , `
∗
n for G with n ≤ k. Observe that `∗j = λ1; indeed, λ1 ⊆ G, so that
by Lemma 4.3, λ1 = `
∗
i for some i. But ξ(λ1) = j, and therefore i = j.
Our goal is to show that ξ is also critical for F ; we will do this by proving
that the lines h∗1, . . . , h
∗
n defined by h
∗
i = `
∗
i for i 6= j and h∗j = λ2 are critical.
For this it will suffice to check that if ` is any line,
(` ∩ F ) \
⋃
i≤n
h∗i ⊆ (` ∩G) \
⋃
i≤n
`∗i ; (1)
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this inclusion would then imply that∣∣∣∣∣(` ∩ F ) \⋃
i≤n
h∗i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣(` ∩G) \⋃
i≤n
`∗i
∣∣∣∣∣ < p− k,
showing that h∗1, . . . , h
∗
n (and hence ξ) are critical for F .
To establish (1), pick x ∈ (` ∩ F ) \⋃i≤n h∗i . It is obvious that x ∈ ` ∩G,
except perhaps in the case that x ∈ λ2. But λ2 = h∗j , so this cannot be, and
therefore we always have x ∈ ` ∩G.
Next, we need to check that x 6∈ `∗i for any i ≤ k. This is obvious if i 6= j,
since `∗i = h
∗
i . Thus it remains to rule out that x ∈ `∗j . If we had x ∈ `∗j = λ1,
we would also have that x ∈ λ1 \ h∗j = λ1 \ λ2. But F does not intersect this
set, so this is impossible.
We conclude that (1) holds, and thus ξ is critical for F , as desired.
As promised, we now have the following:
Lemma 4.6. Every critical colouring is very distinguished.
Proof. If ξ is critical for E, then by Lemma 4.5, it is also critical for every
set of the same hue as E; thus, by Lemma 4.4, it is also distinguished for
every such set.
We have seen that in order to construct very distinguished colourings,
it suffices to construct critical colourings. This has the advantage that the
notion of being critical depends only on a set E and not on the entire hue of
E. However, it is still not entirely obvious when exactly critical colourings
exist or how one is to go about building one.
This is where perfect colourings come into play. Although perfect colour-
ings are not perfect for their entire hue, they are very easy to identify, and
every perfect colouring is automatically critical.
Definition 4.3 (Perfect k–colouring). Given E ⊆ Fdp, let Lm(E) denote the
set of all lines ` such that |` ∩ E| ≥ m.
We say that a k-colouring ξ is perfect for E if different elements of
Lp−k(E) have different colours.
Perfect colourings, when they exist, are quite easy to identify and con-
struct, yet they are always very distinguished:
17
Proposition 4.1. If ξ is a perfect colouring for E, then ξ is very distin-
guished for E.
Proof. First we note that ξ is critical, since we can take all of Lp−k(E) as
critical lines, given that they are all of different colour. Then, by Lemma 4.6,
we have that ξ is very distinguished, as required.
Now for the main result of this section:
Theorem 4.1. Assume that a, b, c, d, k satisfy the following conditions:
1. a is a prime or a prime power,
2. a+ b+ c = ad,
3. k < a,
4. for every S ⊆ Fda with |S| ≤ a+ c, we have |La−k(S)| ≤ k;
5. σd(a) ≥ k(c+ 3).
Then, the colouring protocol is executable.
Proof. Assume that Alice has announced f and for this proof let A,B,C
denote the images of each player’s hand under f . By assumption, |La−k(A∪
C)| ≤ k, so Bob can enumerate La−k(A ∪ C) by ~` = 〈`1, . . . , `n〉, with n ≤
k. Then, by Lemma 4.2, there exists a colouring ξ with density c + 2 and
such that ξ(`i) = i, which by construction is perfect for A ∪ C, so that by
Proposition 4.1, it is also very distinguished. Further, by Lemma 4.1, we see
that ξ is rich, as needed.
The above proof should be seen as a theoretical argument that very dis-
tinguished colourings exist under the above conditions – but never as an
algorithm for constructing them. It is essential for our protocol that Bob
choose randomly among all possible colourings. We leave the specification of
feasible algorithms for doing so for future work.
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5 Finding suitable parameters
The conditions given by Theorem 4.1, while rather general, remain somewhat
implicit. In this subsection we shall compute some explicit bounds on the pa-
rameters which guarantee that these conditions are met. The computations
we will make are a bit rough, but will nevertheless give us a large family of
parameters for which the protocol is guaranteed to work.
They are based on the following counting lemma:
Lemma 5.1. If a set E ⊆ Fdp is such that
|E| < (k + 1)(p− k)− k(k + 1)
2
,
then |Lp−k(E)| ≤ k.
Proof. We argue by contrapositive, assuming that |Lp−k(E)| > k.
Let `1, . . . , `k+1 be distinct lines such that |E∩`i| ≥ p−k. Then, we have
|E| ≥ ∣∣⋃i≤k+1(`i ∩ E)∣∣
≥ ∑i≤k+1 |`i ∩ E| −∑i<j≤k+1 |`i ∩ `j|
≥ (k + 1)(p− k)− 1
2
k(k + 1).
Thus in view of Theorem 4.1, in order to find suitable parameters, it
suffices to solve the system of inequalities
1. a+ c < (k + 1)(a− k)− 1
2
k(k + 1),
2.
ad − 1
a− 1 ≥ k(c+ 3)
or, simplifying a bit,
1. c < ak − 3
2
k(k + 1),
2. ad > k(a− 1)(c+ 3).
From this we immediately obtain the following asymptotic result:
Theorem 5.1. If a is a large enough prime power, the colouring protocol is
executable with
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1. c < O(a3/2) and d = 3 or
2. c < O(a2) and d = 4.
Proof. In view of Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 5.1, it suffices to show that the
above inequalities hold.
For the first result, set k ≈ √a and c ≈ a3/2/2. Then, we have that
ak−3k(k+1)/2 = a3/2+O(a), which for large a is greater than a3/2/2. Meanwhile,
k(a− 1)(c+ 3) = a3/2 +O(a2), which for large a is bounded by a3.
The second is similar; here, set k ≈ a/2 and c ≈ a2/9.
A nice conclusion we obtain from the above result is that indeed c can
be larger than a by any order of magnitude we desire, provided a is large
enough:
Corollary 5.1. Given any natural number N , there exist a, c such that c/a >
N and the colouring protocol is executable, sound and informative for (a, a3−
a− c, c).
Proof. If a  N2 then a3/2 = (a1/2)a  Na and, by Theorem 5.1.1, the
required inequalities hold and the protocol is executable.
Note that we may use Theorem 5.1.1 or Theorem 5.1.2 depending on
whether we wish to keep b relatively small with respect to a or a relatively
small with respect to c. In either case, b = O(c2).
6 Conclusions and further research
The colouring protocol we have presented gives a new and flexible solution to
the generalized Russian cards problem. Our protocol solves the problem in
many cases where the eavesdropper has more cards than one of the players,
and is the first known solution to achieve this. If the generalized Russian
cards problem is to be understood as Find triples (a, b, c) for which a safe
and informative protocol of any length exists, then the current work is a giant
stride over what had been previously achieved.
There are many variations that could be analyzed and might yield impor-
tant results. Alice may have more than one line, there may be more players,
Cath may be allowed to learn a few of the cards, etc. Along these lines, a
particularly promising direction would be to replace lines by other algebraic
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curves. This could, potentially, reduce the size of the whole space (and hence
Bob’s hand) without compromising the existence of suitable colourings.
A different direction to pursue involves cases where either a or a+b+c are
not prime powers. There are already standard techniques to deal with these;
one finds a prime which is not much larger than the desired parameter and
works with that instead. Such techniques have already been used to extend
a different protocol to many new triples in [2] but have not been worked out
in our context.
Meanwhile, the generalized Russian cards problem may have a recre-
ational flavour to it, but it has potential for serious applications in secure
communication. These protocols have an advantage over most traditional
encryption methods in that they are “unconditionally secure”, meaning that
an eavesdropper is unable to decipher messages even when granted unlim-
ited computational capacity. The presupposition of a “dealing stage” is not
so different to authentication systems using security tokens, where the user
receives a physical device that generates one-time passwords. A possible ap-
plication is the development of challenge-response authentication systems.
The user Bob is authenticated against the server Alice by running a Russian
cards protocol. If Alice checks that Bob’s responses are coherent with the
key he should have (Bob’s hand) then the authentication succeeds.
Real-world implementation of these protocols would also require an ad-
ditional computational and probabilistic analysis. What is the complexity of
running the colouring protocol? Are there good algorithms for finding suit-
able colourings? Even if Cath does not learn any cards, how do we minimize
the probability that she guesses them correctly?
To summarize, there is much to be done indeed!
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